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This study examines the Malaysian accretive share buybacks firms from year 2001 to 2008 
to determine the relationship between the corporate governance mechanisms and accretive 
share buybacks, the earnings management device to meet or beat earnings per share (EPS) 
forecast. The regression results of this study reports the significant effect on the relationship 
between corporate governance and accretive share buyback. Basically, there is positive effect 
on the relationship between the board independence, CEO duality and board size with the 
accretive share buyback to meet or beat EPS forecast (MBEF). Multiple directorships and 
managerial ownership documents a negative relationship with accretive share buyback to 
MBEF. However, this study identified insignificant relationship between board meetings 
and accretive share buyback. Using the accretive share buyback as an earnings management 
proxy is a new contribution to determine the roles of corporate governance on accretive share 
buyback to MBEF rather a common study on accruals manipulations and corporate governance 
mechanisms.
Keywords: Accretive Share Buyback; Corporate Governance; Earnings Management; Earnings 
per Share. 
1.  INTRODUCTION
Earnings are important information in the financial report for analyst, investors, senior 
executives and board of directors (Degeorge, Patel & Zeckhauser, 1999). Among the various 
earnings metrics to measure firm performance, earnings per share (EPS) are well-known and 
essential tool to measure firm performance (Graham, Harvey & Rajgopal, 2005; Seetharaman 
& Raj, 2011).  Investors need a threshold or benchmark to measure the earnings performance 
as to evaluate firm’s financial success and also to compensate the managers. Degeorge et al. 
(1999) developed three thresholds as follows: (1) to report quarterly profits, (2) to achieve 
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quarterly earnings increases as previous year quarterly period, and (3) to achieve quarterly 
earnings surprises (whether or not actual EPS meets or beats earnings forecast predicted 
by analysts). According to Brown and Caylor (2005) after mid-1990s, among the three 
thresholds, achieving earnings surprises (meet or beat EPS forecast – MBEF) is the most 
salient thresholds due to investors realization on the importance of achieving earnings forecast 
(positive earnings surprises- MBEF) as it put forward media attention and precision in analyst 
forecasting. Obviously, meeting or beating earnings forecast (MBEF) is an anchor of today’s 
corporate culture, of being able to boost share prices, maximizing management’s credibility 
and avoiding litigation cost that could trigger from negative earnings surprises (Bartov, Givoly 
& Hayn, 2002). In general, firms achieve earnings threshold either through business success 
with good financial performance or through earnings management. It is manifested that, due 
to business pressure, managers practice earnings management to meet or beat EPS forecast 
(MBEF). Firms commonly involve in accruals manipulation (indirect impact to cash flows) and 
real activities manipulation (transactions that gives direct impact to cash flows) as an earnings 
management proxies to adjust the financial reports. Among the two proxies, real activities 
manipulation is difficult to detect as it proceeds like an ordinary business transactions in 
general. Hribar, Jenkins and Johnson (2006) reported that firms used accretive share buyback 
(real activity manipulation) as the earnings management device to meet or beat EPS forecast. 
Accretive share buyback is an earnings management tool that can increase post-buyback EPS 
by a minimum of one cent. Earnings management is a short-term focused that do not contribute 
to firm value (Roychowdhury, 2006). Further, existence of earnings management activities 
indicates a flaw in corporate governance practices in the firm (Graham et al., 2005). Because 
corporate governance is a symbol of good principles and best practices of a firm to protect the 
shareholders rights and not to mislead shareholders through earnings management practices. 
Further, an ineffective board monitoring mechanism is detrimental to a firm (Rahman & Ali, 
2006). Therefore, strong corporate governance is a remedy to decrease earnings management 
activities in firms. This study investigates the nature of relationship between the corporate 
governance mechanisms and accretive share buyback to MBEF. The accretive share buyback 
to MBEF refers to the usage of accretive share buyback to meet or beat the EPS forecast. 
Malaysian earnings management studies commonly use accruals manipulation as the earnings 
management proxy to investigate the relationship between earnings management and 
corporate governance mechanisms. Therefore, this is a good platform to study on corporate 
governance mechanisms and the accretive share buyback as the earnings management proxy. 
This study contributes to the body of knowledge on role of corporate governance mechanisms 
and accretive share buyback the earnings management device to MBEF. 
 
2.  THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS OF PRIOR RESEARCH
In Malaysia share buyback is a corporate payout policy where listed firms are allowed to buy 
back their firm shares under the open market buyback program. The Corporate Law Reform 
Committee introduced Section 67A, Companies Act, 1965 which allows the solvent Malaysian 
Public Listed Companies to purchase own shares with the approval of the shareholders not 
more than 10% of the issued and paid up share capital through Malaysian stock exchange. In 
Malaysia, share buyback activity has shown a remarkable growth for more than a decade. There 
are numerous reasons for share buyback activities and commonly it is believed to increase and 
protects share prices.  However, Hribar et al. (2006) finding on United States firms engaged in 
346Sitraselvi Chandren, Zamri Ahmad and Ruhani Ali
accretive share buyback as the earnings management device to MBEF, reveals a macro-level 
information specifically to the corporate world and academics that share buyback can be also 
used as an earnings management tool to MBEF. 
Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in the financial reporting and in 
structuring transactions to alter the financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about 
the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes 
that depended to the reported accounting numbers (Healy & Wahlen, 1999, p. 368). Earnings 
management is a game between investors and managers. Managers engage in earnings 
management to mask true firm performance as a remedy to avoid investors’ disciplinary action 
(Leuz, Nanda & Wysocki, 2003). Consistently, Chandren, Ahmad and Ali (2015) identified 
that investors’ reward positive share prices to firms for delivering positive earnings surprises 
news through earnings management. Thus, market reacts positively to positive earnings 
surprises announcement. Due to this, firms involve in earnings management to meet or beat 
the EPS forecast (positive earnings surprises) to avoid investors disciplinary action (Chandren 
et al., 2015). 
Separation between ownership and control, increases manager entrenchment level to involve 
in earnings management by manipulating firm’s financial report for their own benefits. This 
manager’s action reduces investors’ trust in financial information (Gulzar & Wang, 2011). 
Therefore, firms need an effective corporate governance to protect the investors’ right by 
controlling the firms’ earnings management activities (Gulzar & Wang, 2011). Firms need 
strong and effective corporate governance mechanisms to reduce earnings management, as to 
protect the rights of the investors (Rahman & Ali, 2006). Effective corporate governance is 
important to strife earnings management activities either by accruals manipulation or by real 
activities manipulation. Good corporate governance requires providing proper incentives for 
the board and management to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the company and its 
shareholders by facilitating effective monitoring (OECD, 2003).
In Malaysia the corporate governance practices came into focus after the Asian Financial 
Crisis 1997 (Susela, 2003). Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) Code issued 
in 1999 mainly focuses on corporate governance principles and practices on board of directors, 
shareholders, accountability and audit. In order to achieve a great efficiency in governance 
framework, this Code sets out best practices guidelines on structures and processes. After 
the revamp of Bursa Malaysia Listing requirements in 2001, the Code became effective to 
listed companies. In 2007, MCCG Code is revised with the aim to strengthen the roles and 
responsibilities of the Board of Directors. This is to ensure they can discharge their duties 
effectively (SC, 2007).  The Capital Market Masterplan 2 (CMP2) is launched in April 2011 
to expand the role of the capital market in invigorating national economic growth as a part 
of the Malaysia’s transformation plans to a developed economy by 2020. Strengthening 
corporate governance therefore represents one of the key thrusts to reinforce investors trust and 
confidence in the Malaysian capital market. This Corporate Governance Blueprint represents 
one of the first deliverables of CMP2. This Blueprint is premised on the paradigm that boards of 
companies occupy a central role as agents for shareholders, both retail and institutional, within 
the corporate governance ecosystem. This action plan is launched by Securities Commission 
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in 8 July 2011, the Corporate Governance Blueprint 2011 is known as Malaysian Code of 
Corporate Governance (MCCG 2012). All listed firms in Malaysia are urged to report on their 
compliance on MCCG 2012 principles and recommendations in the 2012 annual reports. 
The Bursa Malaysia’s Listing Requirement states that the listed firms’ board of directors 
must propose the idea of share buyback to the shareholders through circulars. These circulars 
are used for the approval of the shareholders for the share buyback activities. The board of 
directors is the responsible monitoring mechanism to monitor the actions of the managers 
for the interest of the investors (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Thus, this study will focused on the 
board of directors characteristics as the corporate governance (CG) mechanism to identify the 
nature of relationship between CG mechanisms and the accretive share buyback. This study 
adopt the five main board characteristics as used in Saleh, Iskandar and Rahmat (2005) study 
refers to board independence, CEO duality, board size, multiple directorships and managerial 
ownership as the component of principles and best practices of effective governance. Further, 
board meeting is also an important corporate governance mechanism, thus board meeting is 
included as the one of the corporate governance variable for this study. 
3.  DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESIS
3.1. Board Independence 
Under the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirement, the public listed companies required to have 
sufficient number of outside or non-executive directors to protect the interest of investors 
(Ponnu, 2008). Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance requires Malaysian public listed 
firms to have at least one-third of the board members to be independent and non-executive 
directors. 
According to Rahman and Ali (2006), more board independence better the monitoring 
skills and the authors predicted negative relationship between board independence and 
earnings management. However, the results of Rahman and Ali (2006) and also Hashim 
and Suppiah (2008) found no significant relationship exist between board independence 
and earnings management. The agency theory delineates the fact that the more independent 
directors dominate the board, the greater will be the board’s monitoring and controlling the 
management’s opportunistic behavior and expropriation of firm resources (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Brickley & James, 1987). Consistently, Johari, Saleh and Hassan (2008) found negative 
relationship between board independence and earnings management which is in line with 
agency theory. In addition, the authors reported that more board independence results in 
greater board monitoring mechanism that reduces firm’s earnings management activities. 
Further, Saleh et al. (2005) identified that internal corporate governance mechanism improves 
with the existence of more independent board. This develops the hypothesis;
H1: There is a negative relationship between board independence and accretive share buyback 
to MBEF.
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3.2. CEO Duality 
CEO duality refers to a situation where Chairman is also the CEO of a firm. Malaysian Code 
on Corporate Governance (MCCG) recommends Malaysian public listed firms to have distinct 
and separate roles for Chairman and CEO for better balance of power and avoidance of 
conflict of interest (Ponnu, 2008). Further, Ponnu (2008) said that to promote fair judgment 
and reasonable concern firm’s best practice, no single person in the board allowed controlling 
other board members in decision making process. The separation of CEO duality is not 
enforced under MCCG but it is encouraged that the two positions to be separated (Saleh et al., 
2005). For firms with CEO duality, MCCG seek for transparency in information for public, 
concerning to the elements of independent for the two positions as a measure to promote 
strong governance (Ponnu, 2008).
Johari et al. (2008) highlighted that CEO duality decreases the board monitoring strength. 
It creates a question “who watches the firm” (Abdullah, 2004). Moreover, Chairman’s roles 
are to chair the board meeting and involve in senior management appointment process and 
deciding their compensation benefits (Beasley & Sailterio, 2001). Further, if the CEO is also 
the Chairman, the concentration of power rest with one person which reduces effectiveness of 
corporate monitoring. The separation of these two positions will be advantage to strengthen 
the board monitoring (Johari et al., 2008). In line with this, Saleh et al. (2005) and Nahandi, 
Baghbani and Bolouri (2011) found positive relationships between CEO duality and earnings 
management. This develops the next hypothesis;
H2: There is a positive relationship between CEO duality and accretive share buyback to 
MBEF.   
3.3. Board Size 
Malaysian Codes on Corporate Governance (MCCG) do not regularize board size limit to the 
listed firms. These listed firms can set their board size as long as the size of boards is able to 
manage the corporation. Saleh et al. (2005) found that large board is able to minimize earnings 
management activities. But contrasting opinion from Yermack (1996) that compared to larger 
board, smaller board size monitors the managers effectively. In sum, smaller boards are active 
monitors. Similarly, a study conducted by Rahman and Ali (2006) identified that board size is 
positively related to earnings management. This is because, large board size failed to monitor 
managers to mitigate earnings management activities (Rahman & Ali, 2006). Thus the next 
hypothesis is developed;
H3: There is a positive relationship between board size and accretive share buyback to MBEF. 
3.4. Board Meetings 
Earnings management activities do not signify the true performance of the firm, which 
influence the shareholders and investors to make inaccurate judgments about the firm. 
Therefore, board monitoring is essential in decreasing the occurrence of earnings management 
activities (Gulzar & Wang, 2011). Xie, Davidson and Dadalt (2003) reported that earnings 
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management and board meetings are negatively associated, thus, the more the board meetings 
the lesser the firms involvement in earnings management activities. In addition from these 
findings, Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirement set a compulsory standard requirement for all 
listed companies to disclose in their annual report the number of board meetings conducted 
for the financial year. Beside this, Gulzar and Wang (2011) found that frequent board meetings 
heighten the board activeness in monitoring the management activities. Therefore, the next 
hypothesis is developed;
H4: There is a negative relationship between board meetings and accretive share buyback to 
MBEF.   
3.5. Multiple Directorships 
Multiple directorships means holding director position for more than one board (Haniffa & 
Hudaib, 2006). Practice Note 13 (PN13) issued by Bursa Malaysia in year 2002 allows a 
maximum number of ten directorships for listed firms and fifteen in private limited firms. 
Director of the firms with multiple directorships are good monitors that gives positive impact 
to firm’s financial reporting quality (Hashim & Rahman, 2011). As matter of fact, these 
directors attain monitoring skills (Hashim & Rahman, 2011) from other organization, are 
able to detect firm’s earnings management activities (Saleh et al., 2005). Consistently, Saleh 
et al. (2005) identified that multiple directorships and earnings management are negatively 
related. The authors reported that the negative relationship between the earnings management 
and multiple directorships is due to the gain of experience obtained through directorships in 
other firms.  This shows that earnings management activities are lower for firms with multiple 
directorships. This develops the next hypothesis; 
H5: There is a negative relationship between multiple directorships and accretive share 
buyback to MBEF.   
3.6. Managerial Ownership 
Johari et al. (2008) identified positive relationship between managerial ownership and 
earnings management. The authors found that the more managerial owns the shares the 
greater they manage earnings. Cheng, Warfield and Ye (2011) said that managers with stock 
ownership involve in earnings management to increase firms share prices. To avoid earnings 
disappointments that drops the share prices, these managers intention are higher to meet or beat 
EPS forecast. In year after earnings announcement, managers sell their shares that benefit from 
increased in value accordingly. There is no doubt that managers’ private benefits increases 
at the expense of shareholders. The findings of Cheng et al. (2011) and Johari et al. (2008) 
contradict to agency theory. However the authors’ finding is not in agreement with agency 
theory. Jensen and Meckling (1976) said that the conflict between shareholder and manager 
can be reduced through forming bonding activities between the two parties. This bonding 
activity creates managerial (director) ownership structure, which reduces manager’s personal 
private benefits. Saleh et al. (2005) and Alves (2012) found negative relationship between 
earnings management and managerial ownership. Alves (2012) identified that managerial 
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ownership decreases the level of earnings management which ultimately improves the firms’ 
earnings quality. This develops the final hypothesis;
H6: There is a negative relationship between managerial ownership and accretive share 
buyback to MBEF. 
The following paragraph discussed on the controls variables used for this study. Cash levels: 
Firms needs more cash for real activities manipulation relative to accruals manipulation. 
Therefore, firms with more cash use buybacks to manage earnings to meet or beat earnings 
forecast (Hribar et al., 2006). Firm size: Bhushan (1989) said that analyst focused more 
on larger firms relative to smaller firms. This gives larger firms more pressure to engage in 
earnings management to MBEF. Shen and Chih (2007) reported that larger firms are under 
closer scrutiny such as investments banks and analyst. This leads the large firms to manage 
earnings. Number of Analyst: Yu (2008) reported that more analyst coverage lesser the firm’s 
earnings management activities. This is because the managers are aware that they are at a 
higher risk of getting caught involving in earnings management activities. Big 4 Auditor (AUD 
4): The earnings management activities are lesser in firms with high quality auditor (Gul, Lyn 
& Tsui, 2001). Johari et al. (2008) used Big-4 Auditors as the control variable for their study. 
The authors believe that firms with Big-4 auditor will have less earnings management activity. 
4.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A total of 220 Malaysian listed firms engaged in accretive share buyback that meets or beats 
EPS forecast from year 2001 to 2008. As the sample observation is collected from year 2001, 
the scope of this study covers MCCG 2000. The information on accretive share buyback, board 
independence, CEO duality, board size, board meetings, multiple directorship and managerial 
ownership are obtain from the Annual Reports available in the Bursa Malaysia website.  The 
EPS forecast information from year 2001 to 2008 is collected from Thomson DataStream 
through Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (IBES). The beginning and basic EPS forecast 
is used similar to Hribar et al. (2006). The actual annual EPS data for year 2001 - 2008, is 
obtained from the annual reports on Bursa Malaysia websites as per the firm’s financial year. 
This study use Hribar’s model to measure the accretive share buyback as the earnings 
management model.
Pre-buyback EPS (PEPS) is computed as:
PEPS =NE /( OShares  + [Av* IS ] )  
Where:
PEPS = Pre-buyback EPS
NE = Reported annual earnings
OShares = Outstanding shares at the beginning of the year
Av = Average (0.5) number of share issued during the year
IS = Share issued during the year
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The pre-buyback (as-if) EPS is computed to measure what would be the EPS without share 
buyback. The pre-share buyback EPS (PEPS) is calculated by dividing the reported annual 
earnings by the outstanding shares at the beginning of the year plus share issued during the 
year.
To estimate accretive share buyback:
AEPS = REPS –PEPS   
Where:
AEPS = Accretive Share Buyback
REPS = Reported (Post-buyback) EPS 
PEPS = Pre-buyback EPS
To identify whether the share buyback is an accretive share buyback (AEPS) or an earnings 
management device to manage earnings (MBEF), the actual EPS after share buyback (REPS) 
is expected to be more than a minimum of 1 cent against the pre-share buyback EPS (PEPS). 
The OLS regression model is used for this study. The accretive share buyback firms that 
MBEF are the dependent variable (BUYVOLUME) for this study. The independent variables 
are the six corporate governance variables and followed by the four control variables stated 
in the model below. This study used accretive share buyback volume for MBEF firms as the 
dependent variable simply because under Bursa Listing Requirements (Chapter 12) a firm is 
required to submit a proposal of the buyback intention to Bursa Malaysia and then send circular 
to shareholders for the purpose of buyback implementation before conducting an extraordinary 
general meeting (EGM) or annual general meeting (AGM) to get the shareholders’ approval 
before buybacks are allowed. Therefore, the board of directors (corporate governance 
mechanism) proposed the intention of buyback in terms of volume of shares to the shareholders 
and the actual value in Ringgit Malaysia will not be known until the actual buyback activity 
takes place in the open-market buyback program. Thus, accretive share buyback volume is 
used as the dependent variable and corporate governance mechanisms used as the independent 
variables to determine the relationship between corporate governance mechanism (board of 
directors) and accretive share buyback to MBEF.   
The linear model used to test the relationship as follows: 
Where:
i : Firm
BUYVOLUME : Accretive share buyback volume that MBEF (unit of shares) for the 
year (log). 
Board Independent : Number of independent non-executive directors divided by total 
(BDINDPDC)  number of board of directors.
(1)BUYVOLUMEi = α + ß1BDINDPDCi + ß2CDi + ß3BDSIZEi + ß4BDMEETi +
ß5MULTIDIRi + ß6MANOWNERi + ß7CLi + ß8TAi + ß9NOANALYSTi + 
ß10 BIGAUDFIRMi + εi
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CEODUALITY (CD) : Equal 1 if CEO and Chairman is the same person (no separate 
position) and 0 otherwise.
Board Size (BDSIZE) : Total number of directors on the board.
Board Meeting : Total number of board meetings conducted in a year.
(BDMEET) 
Multiple Directorships : Proportion of Directors on the board of the company having at least 
(MULTIDIR)  one additional directorship in another company to total number of 
directors on the board.
Managerial Ownership : Percentage of Directors in managerial capacity (CEO / Executive 
(MANOWNER)   Chairman/ Executive Directors) owns direct ownership
Cash Levels (CL) : The ratio of firm’s beginning of the year cash and cash equivalents 
to total assets.
Firm Size (TA) : Size is the logarithm of total assets at the beginning of the year 
Number of Analyst  : Number of Analyst forecasted on the first day of the fiscal year EPS
(NOANALYST)   forecast.
Audit Firm  : Value of 1 if the firm engage Big-4 audit firm and value of 0 otherwise
(BIGAUDFIRM) 
5.  RESULTS
Table 1 presents the variables that are used to observe the relationship between accretive share 
buyback volumes with corporate governance mechanism.








BDINDPDC 0.403 0.375 0.092 1.161 0.300 0.670 0.333 0.444
CD 0.136 0.000 0.344 2.134 0.00 1.000 0.000 0.000
BDSIZE 8.196 8.000 2.118 0.936 5.000 15.000 7.000 9.000
BDMEET 5.168 5.000 1.269 1.222 4.000 10.000 4.000 6.000
MULTIDIR  0.627 0.667 0.270 -0.468 0 1.000 0.400 0.857
MANOWNER
(%) 9.978 2.201 15.651 1.830 0.000 61.64 0.2537 12.339
Control Variables         
CL 0.111 0.089 0.108 1.894 -0.130 0.790 0.336 0.1702
TA 20.151 19.979 1.270 0.799 17.470 24.090 19.173 20.727
NOANALYST 5.668 3.000 6.381 1.823 1.000 26.000 2.000 6.000
BIGAUD
FIRM 0.691 1.000 0.463 -0.832 0 1.000 0 1.000
Sitraselvi Chandren, Zamri Ahmad and Ruhani Ali
353
From the 220 samples in Table 1, the average accretive share buyback volume is 7.152 
million. The maximum volume accretive share buyback is 151.825 million with the value 
of RM1,079,914,000. The minimum accretive share buyback is 1,000 units of shares for the 
value of RM7, 000. The variance between accretive share buyback volumes between mean of 
7.152 and median of 1.765 are large. Therefore, the accretive share buyback volume has been 
transformed into logarithm volume. By using the logarithm volume of accretive share buyback 
produce a mean of 14.891 and median of 15. 
The first corporate governance variables used for this study is board independence 
(BDINDPDC). Board independence is defined as the number of independent non-executives 
directors divided by total number of board of directors. From Table 1, average board 
independence is 0.403 (40.3 percent), followed by the lowest percentile of sample is less 
than 0.333 (33 percent). This reveals that majority of samples are within the requirement of 
the Code of Corporate Governance which require one third (1/3) or 33 percent proportion 
of independence non-executive directors from the total number of directors (Johari et al., 
2008). However, the average of 40.3 percent of board independence evidence that there is still 
domination of insiders by 60 percent in the samples board composition. The CEO duality (CD) 
is equal to 1 if the CEO and Chairman are the same person and 0 otherwise. It is observed 
that from the 220 samples nearly 13.6 percent is in a CEO duality position. This means that 
majority of the samples CEO and the Chairman are not holding the same position. This result 
above is similar to Johari et al. (2008) that only 10.3 percent out of the 224 samples with CEO 
duality position. The average board size (BDSIZE) is 8.  For board meetings (BDMEET) the 
mean is 5 (5.168) with maximum 10 board meetings in a year. The multiple directorships 
(MULTIDIR) result shows on average 0.627 (62.7) directors having directorships in other 
firms. The descriptive statistics result for managerial ownership (MANOWNER) presents that 
on average 10 percent (9.978) of the directors having direct ownerships.  
The following Table 2 shows the Pearson correlation results of accretive share buyback 
(earnings management proxy) with the corporate governance mechanisms and control 
variables.
Table 2: Correlations of Accretive Share Buyback and Variables
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N 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 
ACCSB 1 -.042 .197** .26** .174** -.48** -.264** .203** .122* .350** .073 
BDINDPDC - 1 -.050 -.400** .091 .074 .123* -.179** -.131* -.238** -.016 
CD .- - 1 .057 .106 -.18** .078 .016 -.011 .216** -.221** 
BDSIZE - - - 1 -.015 -.126* -.191** .174** .128* .313** -.045 
BDMEET - - - - 1 -.123* -.171** .034 .003 .185** -.171** 
MULTIDR - - - - - 1 .142* -.131* -.017 -.121* .032 
MANOWNER - - - - - .- 1 -.099 -.013 -.121* .112* 
CL - - - - - - - 1 .145* .221** .015 
TA - - - - - - - - 1 .186** -.012 
NOANALYST - - - - - - - - - 1 -.126* 
BIGAUDFIRM - - - - - - - - - - 1 
Notes: ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level; * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
Table 3 presents the results of the multiple regression of accretive share buyback (earnings management proxy) 
with the corporate governance mechanisms and control variables.  
 
Table 3: Regression Results of the Accretive Share Buyback and Variables 
 Coefficients t-value VIF 
Dependent variable 
Accretive Share Buyback- ACCSB (BUYVOLUME) 
 
Independent Variables    
Board Independence (BDINDPDC) 
CEODUALITY (CD) 
Board  Size (BDSIZE) 
Board Meeting (BDMEET) 
















Managerial Ownership (MANOWNER) -0.185 -3.282** 1.126 
    
Control Variables    
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Table 3: Regression Results of the Accretive Share Buyback and Variables
Table 3 presents the results of the multiple regression of accretive share buyback (earnings 
management proxy) with the corporate governance mechanisms and control variables. 
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composition. The CEO duality (CD) is equal to 1 if the CEO and Chairman are the same person and 0 otherwise. 
It is observed that from the 220 samples nearly 13.6 percent is in a CEO duality position. This means that majority 
of the samples CEO and the Chairman are not holding the same position. This result above is similar to Johari et 
al. (2008) that only 10.3 percent out of the 224 samples with CEO duality position. The average board size 
(BDSIZE) is 8.  For board meetings (BDMEET) the mean is 5 (5.168) with maximum 10 board meetings in a 
year. The multiple directorships (MULTIDIR) result shows on average 0.627 (62.7) directors having directorships 
in other firms. The descriptive statistics result for managerial ownership (MANOWNER) presents that on average 
10 percent (9.978) of the directors having direct ownerships.   
 
The following Table 2 shows the Pearson correlation results of accretive share buyback (earnings management 
proxy) with the corporate governance mechanisms and control variables.  
 






































































N 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 
ACCSB 1 -.042 .197** .26** .174** -.48** -.264** .203** .122* .350** .073 
BDINDPDC - 1 -.050 -.400** .091 .074 .123* -.179** -.131* -.238** -.016 
CD .- - 1 .057 .106 -.18** .078 .016 -.011 .216** -.221** 
BDSIZE - - - 1 -.015 -.126* -.191** .174** .128* .313** -.045 
BDMEET - - - - 1 -.123* -.171** .034 .003 .185** -.171** 
MULTIDR - - - - - 1 .142* -.131* -.017 -.121* .032 
MANOWNER - - - - - .- 1 -.099 -.013 -.121* .112* 
CL - - - - - - - 1 .145* .221** .015 
TA - - - - - - - - 1 .186** -.012 
NOANALYST - - - - - - - - - 1 -.126* 
BIGAUDFIRM - - - - - - - - - - 1 
Notes: ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level; * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
Table 3 presents the results of the multiple regression of accretive share buyback (earnings management proxy) 
with the corporate governance mechanisms and control variables.  
 
Table 3: Regression Results of the Accretive Share Buyback and Variables 
 Coefficients t-value VIF 
Dependent variable 
Accretive Share Buyback- ACCSB (BUYVOLUME) 
 
Independent Variables    
Board Independence (BDINDPDC) 
CEODUALITY (CD) 
Board  Size (BDSIZE) 
Board Meeting (BDMEET) 
















Managerial Ownership (MANOWNER) -0.185 -3.282** 1.126 
    
Control Variables    
The R-squared is 0.411 and F statistics results of 14.571 at 1% significant level. This study 
predicted that greater the board independence (BDINDPDC) lesser the earnings management 
through accretive share buyback. This is also consistent with agency theory, more outsiders’ 
increases monitoring mechanism that reduces the agency cost. However, the outcome of the 
results reported positive coefficient of 0.139 with a t value of 2.374 (5% significance level), 
this means that board independence increased by 1% and other variables such as CEO duality, 
board size, board meeting, multiple directorships, managerial ownerships and  control variables 
are held constant, accretive share buyback volume increased by 0.139 unit of shares. This 
interprets that firms with more board independence greater will be the involvement in accretive 
share buyback to MBEF.  Therefore, this indicates that accretive share buyback (ACCSB) and 
board independence are positively related. However, this study result is different from Johari 
et al. (2008) study that documented negative relationship between earnings management and 
board independence.
This study found positive coefficient for accretive share buyback and CEO duality (CD) at 
0.127 (5% significance level). The results are however consistent with Saleh et al. (2005)  study 
reported positive coefficient of 0.153 which means that CEO duality and earnings management 
VIFt-valueCoefficients
Dependent variable
Accretive Share Buyback- ACCSB (BUYVOLUME)
Independent Variables   
Board Independence (BDINDPDC) 0.139 2.374* 1.220
CEODUALITY (CD) 0.127  2.220*  1.156
Board  Size (BDSIZE) 0.142   2.366*   1.272
Board Meeting (BDMEET) 0.058   1.036   1.124
Multiple Directorship (MULTIDIR) -0.380 -6.848** 1.090
Managerial Ownership (MANOWNER) -0.185 -3.282** 1.126
   
Control Variables   
Cash Levels (CL) 0.069 1.231 1.102
Firm Size (TA) 0.065 1.181 1.061
Number of Analyst (NOANALYST) 0.228 3.778** 1.292
Big-4 Audit Firm (BIGAUDFIRM) 0.181 3.250** 1.097




Sitraselvi Chandren, Zamri Ahmad and Ruhani Ali
Notes: ** Significant at 0.01 level; * Significant at 0.05 level.
355
are significantly related. Further in line with Nahandi et al. (2011) study, reported positive 
coefficient of 0.041 at the 5% significant level for CEO duality and earnings management. The 
positive coefficient of accretive share buyback (ACCSB) with board size (BDSIZE) is at 0.142 
(5% significance level). Hence, this indicates that large board size encourages firms to MBEF 
through accretive share buyback. Furthermore, the outcome is consistent with Rahman and Ali 
(2006) reported a positive coefficient of 0.113 that interprets a positive significant relationship 
exist between board size and earnings management. This regression results further strengthen 
on the positive relationship of CEO duality with accretive share buyback and board size with 
accretive share buyback.  
The result reported non-significant relationship between accretive share buyback (earnings 
management proxy) and board meetings (BDMEET) with coefficient at 0.058. The results 
showed positive coefficient but not significant between accretive share buyback and board 
meetings. The finding is unable to justify the nature of relationship between board meetings 
and accretive share buyback in the context of real activity manipulation as the earnings 
management proxy. However, the outcome of this study is contrary to Gulzar and Wang (2011) 
finding, the authors found that more board meetings held in a firm is able to reduce earnings 
management activities. 
This study also finds a significant negative relationship between accretive share buyback and 
multiple directorships (MULTIDIR) and accretive share buyback and managerial ownership 
(MANOWNER). For accretive share buyback and multiple directorships reported negative 
coefficient of -0.380 with the t value of -6.848 (1% significance level). The results reveal that the 
increase of directorship in another firm reflects the tendency of the concern firm involvement in 
accretive share buyback to MBEF is gradually reduced. Followed by accretive share buyback 
and managerial ownership showed also negative coefficient of -0.185 (1% significance level). 
Similarly this interprets that with other variables held constant, accretive share buyback volume 
decreases by 0.185 units of shares if managerial ownership shares increases by 1 percent. 
The outcome of this study proves that the presence of multiple directorships and managerial 
ownership is able to reduce earnings management (Saleh et al., 2005) through accretive share 
buyback. This is also in line with Alves (2012) study that managerial ownership and earnings 
management is negatively related.
Among the four control variables used for this study only number of analyst (NOANALYST) 
and Big-4 audit firm (BIGAUDFIRM) showed significant relationship with accretive share 
buyback. Both control variables shown the existence of positive relationship of number 
of analyst and accretive share buyback with positive coefficient of 0.228 (1% significance 
level); Big-4 audit firm with accretive share buyback with positive coefficient of 0.181 (1% 
significance level). However the number of analyst with accretive share buyback result is 
not coinciding with Yu (2008) study, reported negative association of number of analyst and 
earnings management. As for Big-4 audit firms, the results are inconsistent with Johari et 
al. (2008) study found insignificant relationship between earnings management and Big-4 
audit firm. The reason for positive relationship between Big-4 audit firms and accretive share 
buyback as the real activities manipulation is not easily detectable by auditors. For cash levels 
(CL) and firm size (TA) the results are insignificant with accretive share buyback when tested 
with corporate governance variables. 
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5.1. Additional Analysis on Large Managerial Ownership and Accretive Share Buyback
Johari et al. (2008) study found that earnings management and managerial ownership are 
positively related at the significant value of 1 percent. Consistently, the authors also found 
that large managerial ownership (above 25 percent) encourage more the earnings management 
activities. This shows that through Johari’s study there is consistency in their findings, the 
managerial ownership and larger managerial ownership encourage earnings management 
activities. Therefore, the negative coefficient between accretive share buyback and managerial 
ownership result in Table 3 shows that managerial ownership discourages the accretive share 
buyback activities. This study expects the large managerial ownership above 25 percent 
(similar to Johari et al., 2008) also to discourage accretive share buyback activities. Thus, 
further analysis is conducted to investigate the nature of relationship between large managerial 
ownership and accretive share buyback. For this regression analysis, a dummy variable for 
large managerial ownership (value of 1 for managerial ownership above 25 percent and value 
of zero for managerial ownership below 25 percent) is used in the model [2]. The variables 
in the linear model [2] are the same as the variables in the linear model [1] except for the 
exclusion of managerial ownership (MANOWNER and replaced with large managerial 
ownership (LARGEMANOWN) variable as follows:
 
(2)BUYVOLUMEi = α + ß1BDINDPDCi + ß2CDi + ß3BDSIZEi + ß4BDMEETi +
ß5MULTIDIRi + ß6MANOWNERi + ß7CLi + ß8TAi + ß9NOANALYSTi + 
ß10 BIGAUDFIRMi + εi
The regression results mainly to show the relationship outcome between accretive share 
buyback and large managerial ownership are presented in Table 4. The R-squared reported for 
this model is 0.392. The negative coefficient results of 0.115 (t value of -2.035) for accretive 
share buyback and large managerial ownership is significant at 5% level. Apparently, the 
relationship between accretive share buyback with other variables (corporate governance 
and control variables) coefficient directions and significant levels are similar to the original 
regression results for this study in Table 3. This result proves that not only managerial 
ownership discourages accretive share buyback (refer to Table 3), large managerial ownership 
also plays an important role in discouraging the accretive share buyback activities (refer to 
Table 4). The finding on the negative relationship between accretive share buyback and large 
managerial ownership supports Lee and Hwang (2012) study on 323 sample firms from year 
2005 to 2008 to observe the effect of managerial ownership and earnings management. The 
authors discovered that the alignment effects of agency theory works effectively in reducing 
earnings management activities with large managerial ownership.
6.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The result for the board independence and the accretive share buyback is contradicting to 
agency theory. The agency theory documents that more outsiders (board independence) 
are able to solve the agency issues between principals and managers. This reflects that 
earnings management activities can be controlled and monitored with the existence of board 
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independence. Interestingly, the result claims that board independence are positively related 
to accretive share buyback to MBEF. This is in contrast to Johari et al. (2008) findings that 
the independent board members are competent in detecting earnings managements. However, 
Johari et al. (2008) used accrual manipulations as the earnings management proxy in their 
study. Thus, the board independence has the competence to detect and discourage earnings 
management through accruals manipulation activities which is easily detectable by the auditors 
and creates accounting scandals in the firms (Graham et al., 2005). As for real activities 
manipulation such as accretive share buyback will not create any accounting scandals and is 
not easily detectable by outside directors or auditors because it is within the ordinary course of 
business activities. Moreover, share buyback is an activity allowed to Malaysian listed firms 
by Companies Act 1965. Apparently, Rahman and Ali (2006) pointed out that the capability of 
the board independence in carrying out their monitoring roles is ineffective due to existence 
of management dominance over the board matters. Based on the descriptive statistics in Table 
1 is found that the mean for board independence or the outside directors is 40.3. This reflects 
that more than 50 percent of the board members are still management. Therefore, it proofs on 
the existence of the management dominance in making the board decisions which is consistent 
with Rahman and Ali (2006) argument. Even there is management dominance; the board 
independence required to be at their best roles in monitoring skill to be in line with agency 
Table 4: Regression Results of the Accretive Share Buyback and Variables 
(Further Analysis on Large Managerial Ownership)
t-valueCoefficients
Dependent variable   
Accretive Share Buyback- ACCSB (BUYVOLUME)  
Independent Variables
Board Independence (BDINDPDC) 0.133 2.237*
CEODUALITY (CD) 0.113   1.954*
Board  Size (BDSIZE) 0.154   2.533*
Board Meeting (BDMEET) 0.072    1.263
Multiple Directorship (MULTIDIR) -0.387 -6.880**
Large Managerial Ownership (LARGEMANOWN) -0.115 -2.035*
  
Control Variables  
Cash Levels (CL) 0.076 1.352
Firm Size (TA) 0.066 1.188
Number of Analyst (NOANALYST) 0.226 3.676**
Big-4 Audit Firm (BIGAUDFIRM) 0.170 3.015**




Notes: ** Significant at 0.01 level; * Significant at 0.05 level.
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theory. Rahman and Ali (2006) further quoted that if the board failed to function well, it would 
be detrimental to a firm and investors. This is reason why Corporate Governance Blueprint 
2011 urged board independence to act independently and at best interest of the firms.
According to this study, CEO duality is positively associated with accretive share buyback 
to meet or beat EPS forecast. Thus, the hypothesis is supported. This is consistent with Saleh 
et al. (2005) and Nahandi et al. (2011) studies that CEO duality reduces board effectiveness 
in discouraging earnings management. According to Nahandi et al. (2011), agency theory 
posits that combined leadership position do not increase firm performance so firms require to 
split the roles of CEO and Chairman as recommended in Cadbury Report 1992. Saleh et al. 
(2005) also strongly recommends to Bursa Malaysia to separate the CEO and Chairman roles 
for effective monitoring mechanisms. In Corporate Governance Blueprint 2011 reported that 
existence of conflict of interest when CEO is also the Chairman of the firm. This will raise a 
question of balance of power issue between CEO and board independence. Because, it affects 
the board independence capability on their exercise of judgments once they are beholden by 
the management. Thus, Corporate Governance Blueprint 2011 highlights on the separation 
of the roles between CEO and Chairman so that both parties can focus on their respective 
responsibilities. In order for the board independence to work effectively is important to split 
the roles between CEO and Chairman. However, this MCCG 2012 is effective from 2012 
annual reports that firms can opt for separating CEO and Chairman roles on a voluntary basis 
for effective board independence functionality.  
As for board size, this study acknowledges that large board size positively related with 
accretive share buyback to meet or beat EPS forecast (MBEF), similar to previous study of 
Rahman and Ali (2006). Thus, the hypothesis is supported. Rahman and Ali (2006) reported 
that large board size weakens the board monitoring mechanism on managers’ actions. Nahandi 
et al. (2011) also noted that large board size heightens the manager’s opportunistic behavior 
which increases on the firm’s earnings management activities. In accordance with Corporate 
Governance Blueprint 2011, board size should be optimal to a firm with combination of 
effective skills and participation. In sum, board size should be a contributor not a root cause. As 
such, the large board size can be one of the root causes to encourage accretive share buyback 
to MBEF. Thus, firms should have an optimal board size with well combination of group 
dynamics and expertise to keep earnings management activities under control.    
Based on the outcome of this study, no significant relationship is identified for board meetings 
and accretive share buyback. Conversely, Gulzar and Wang (2011) found that more meetings 
improvise board monitoring which helps in decreasing earnings management. For this 
study, it is identified that most firms from the sample observations on average had 5 annual 
board meetings only. Therefore, this study is unable to conclude whether board meeting 
encourages or discourages the accretive share buyback to MBEF.  In sum, the encouragement 
or discouragement of accretive share buyback activities cannot merely determine from 
the number of board meetings. Thus, in order to make the board meetings as an effective 
monitoring mechanism to reduce earnings management, the directors’ commitment in terms 
of time and attention in the meeting are important. The subject matter discussion in the board 
meetings must be based on thoughtful contribution and effective deliberation process by the 
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board members. As stated in the Corporate Governance Blueprint 2011, the directors urge to 
spent sufficient time in reviewing well the materials discussed in the board meetings. This is the 
reason why this study failed to identify the nature of relationship between board meeting and 
accretive share buyback. In sum, earnings managements could not be discourage or detected 
through number of board meetings, it can only be detected through strong deliberations of 
board members in the meetings. 
Multiple directorships posit a better monitoring skill in controlling firm’s agency problem 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983). This is because they attain skills, knowledge and expertise to efficiently 
monitor on the managers activities (Hashim & Rahman, 2011). Thus, multiple directors are 
diligent monitors (Hashim & Rahman, 2011). This study found that the multiple directorships 
relationship is significantly negative to accretive share buyback to MBEF. Consistently, the 
hypothesis is supported. The outcome of this study is similar to Saleh et al. (2005) study 
that multiple directorships are an important monitoring mechanism. Thus, firms with multiple 
directorships discourage accretive share buyback to MBEF. 
As in Saleh et al. (2005) and Alves (2012) studies, this study identified that the managerial 
ownership has a significant negative relationship with accretive share buyback to MBEF. 
The bonding relationship between the principals and the agents as addressed in the agency 
theory decreases conflict of interest between the both parties which ultimately strengthen 
the monitoring mechanism. Further, the study of Kamardin and Haron (2011) identified that 
managerial ownership is a significant monitoring mechanism in aligning managers’ decision 
making with investors’ interest. According to Mustapa and Che Ahmad (2011) managerial 
ownership and firm monitoring cost are negatively related as predicted by the agency theory. 
The authors found that when managers hold shares in the firm, lesser the information asymmetry 
and create an incentive to monitor the firm. Similarly, the finding of this study proves that 
when the managers become part of the shareholders, lesser the managers’ opportunistic 
behavior to encourage the firms to involve in the accretive share buyback to MBEF. Thus, 
this indicates that managerial ownerships discourage earnings management through accretive 
share buyback. The finding of this study also reveals that large managerial ownership gives 
positive impact to discourage firms to involve in accretive share buyback to MBEF. Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1988) study on the relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
value, highlighted that large managerial ownership (beyond 25%) increases the firm value 
where the entrenchment level of the managers are minimal. Morck et al. (1988) supports the 
finding of this study that large managerial ownership discourages accretive share buyback 
to MBEF. Apparently, the finding of this study shows that managerial ownership and large 
managerial ownership discourage the accretive share buyback activities. 
Overall this study proves that the corporate governance mechanisms have an impact on 
earnings management through accretive share buyback. This study concludes that board 
independence must have sufficient knowledge on real activities manipulation and free from 
management dominance, to separate CEO and Chairman position, to maintain an optimal board 
size, quality board meetings with strong deliberations and thorough discussion from directors, 
more directorships in other firms and increased in managerial ownership will discourage 
the accretive share buyback to MBEF. The responsibility to implement firms best practices 
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through strong corporate governance to mitigate earnings management activities not only rest 
with the board of directors as the central agent between shareholders and management. It 
should be a joint effort of internal and external stakeholders to reduce firms’ involvement in 
earnings management activities to achieve the short-term strategies and set more emphasis 
in achieving the long-term strategies to increase the firm value. Therefore, the external 
stakeholders for example shareholders or investors should not penalize the firms for failing to 
MBEF (a short-term strategy) rather support the firms in achieving their long-term objectives. 
This study sample observations starts from year 2001 to 2008. Thus, for corporate governance 
measures this study used MCCG 2000. However, this study recommends the future study to 
use corporate governance measures as in MCCG 2012 to investigate nature of relationship 
between corporate governance mechanism and accretive share buyback to meet or beat EPS 
forecast.
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